From Discrete to Continuous Highest-earning Imitation Dynamics

arXiv:2605.09831v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Imitating the highest earners is a common decision-making heuristic, but in finite populations it can generate persistent fluctuations between strategies. This paper studies whether such fluctuations persist as population size grows in heterogeneous two-strategy populations. We show that the Markov chains describing the discrete imitation dynamics form generalized stochastic approximation processes for a good upper semicontinuous differential inclusion, which defines the associated mean dynamics. We prove that these mean dynamics always converge to equilibria. Using stochastic approximation results, we then show that the amplitudes of fluctuations in the population proportions of the two strategies vanish almost surely as population size tends to infinity. Thus, in well-mixed large populations, highest-earning imitation is unlikely to produce large-scale perpetual fluctuations.