Pure Nash Equilibria
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STON'R Converges to First-Order Nash~Equilibria of Multiplayer Games
arXiv:2606.09565v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Nonconcave games present a unique challenge, as neither pure Nash equilibria nor local Nash equilibria (LNE) are guaranteed to exist, even in zero-sum settings. Additionally, computing approximate LNE in smooth multiplayer games over bounded regions is PPAD-hard. These challenges, coupled with the inherent complexity, have driven recent research toward broader equilibrium concepts, such as min-max critical points, and first-order Nash...
Fairness in two-player zero-sum games with bandit feedback
Announce Type: new Abstract: We study two-player zero-sum games (TPZSGs) with bandit feedback under fairness constraints requiring every action to be played with probability at least $\alpha/m$. Existing instance-dependent results target $\textit{pure}$ Nash equilibria, while fairness generically produces $\textit{mixed}$ equilibria, a harder learning target. Our key technical tool is a reparametrization: every fair strategy decomposes as $p = (\alpha/m)\mathbf{1} + (1-\alpha)\widetilde{p}$...
N-Player Binary Games with Unidirectional Dependencies: Cycle Robustness and Induced Indifference
new Abstract: The present study provides a closed-form characterisation of Nash equilibria in N-player binary games with unidirectional dependencies. While general network games are PPAD-complete, prior work has established that trees or paths admit polynomial-time solutions via dynamic programming. We provide a deterministic characterisation for the subclass of directed cycle graphical games, demonstrating that non-zero boundary incentives linearize the topology into a feed-forward propagation.
Envy Cycle Elimination with Strategic Agents: Best Responses and Fairness Guarantees
arXiv:2605.31253v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: With strong evidence in the literature showing that fairness and truthfulness are incompatible, there is a recent line of work focusing on the fairness properties of equilibria of simple fair division mechanisms, especially Round-Robin. We consider the Envy Cycle Elimination (E-C-E) procedure of Lipton et al.