Commentary: Threat of influence operations in Singapore is undefined but ever present

Commentary: Threat of influence operations in Singapore is undefined but ever present The origins and motive of social media posts attacking Singaporean society are hard to discern, but there are ways to respond, says strategic consultancy managing director Nicholas Fang. SINGAPORE: In a significant move last Saturday (Jun 6), the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) took steps to block several social media posts targeting the Indian community. Under the Online Criminal Harms Act, the police issued directions to YouTube, Facebook and X to disable Singapore users’ access to the posts, which originated overseas. While there is no evidence that the inflammatory posts are part of a coordinated campaign, they are still worth paying close attention to. Prior to the latest announcement by MHA last weekend, the government blocked six websites in April set up by foreign actors that could be used to mount hostile information campaigns. The six websites masqueraded as Singapore news outlets by using Singapore-associated terms in their domain names and carrying local content. Research done by my team at Black Dot Research, a market and social research consultancy, shows a proliferation of videos online in recent months that were created with the assistance of artificial intelligence. The videos, in the form of pseudo-documentaries, were shared on platforms such as YouTube and are mostly in Chinese. They often start out complimentary about Singapore before spiralling into critical content that combines facts, commentary, speculation and outright false information. In recent weeks, some of these narratives include predictions that Singapore’s energy supplies would run out in two weeks, a nod to the ongoing conflict in Iran, and the allegation that the country’s economy is predicated on money laundering. These are patently untrue. LOW-COST AND ANONYMOUS The use of information operations by bad actors to target adversaries is not new. We have seen such tactics deployed in conflicts ranging from the invasion of Ukraine to the war in Iran. They have also become commonplace in scenarios that fall below the threshold of all-out war, for instance, when evidence emerged that Russia sought to influence the 2016 US elections. For state and non-state actors, information operations are low-cost and often provide a level of anonymity. There are also increasingly more private sector entities willing to provide such services for a fee. The true motive and originator of such content are hard to discern. And while Singapore authorities said there is no evidence of a state-led campaign targeting the country, it is not hard to see how bad actors might destabilise the government, spread disharmony among citizens, or simply create chaos and confusion in a society. MOUNTING A RESPONSE Countering threats posed by information operations was a key focus of the Riga StratCom Dialogue, an event organised by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence which I spoke at last week. Experts highlighted three key pillars in responding to such threats, and they have varying degrees of applicability for countries like Singapore. First, governments can disrupt information operations by working with technology companies and social media platforms to restrict access to harmful content. They can also go after payment pathways through which such activities are funded, or impose legislation that targets such attacks and behaviour. The challenge of this approach is coordinating efforts across multiple agencies and involving the public and private sectors to achieve the desired outcomes. The Singapore government has already demonstrated the willingness to deploy some of these measures, and the country’s small size enables it to adopt a whole-of-government approach to national threats. A second approach mooted in Riga was to take a more offensive stance against adversaries rather than a defensive or passive one. This was understandably favoured by many NATO and European representatives who had experienced first-hand the actions of an adversary such as Russia in the four-year-long war in Ukraine. This approach might prove problematic for a country like Singapore, which is not under threat from a clear and present danger in the form of a specific adversary. Indeed, the country’s preference for a principled approach underpinned by diplomacy and mutually beneficial relations with international partners might render offensive actions incongruent, even in the greyer information space. A more complicated discussion revolves around creating a universally accepted code governing information or influence operations akin to the Law of Armed Conflict, Geneva Conventions of 1949. Absent such a framework, and any rule-abiding nation such as Singapore might struggle to greenlight offensive operations on any scale. A third, and potentially more acceptable, countermeasure involves inoculating a population that could become the target of a bad actor. Such an approach would require public outreach to raise media literacy, and civil society organisations such as fact-checkers to highlight the threat of disinformation. This would avoid the pitfalls of a whack-a-mole strategy when it comes to taking down specific content or platforms, which can be an exercise in futility given the speed at which they spread, and the scale at which they can be deployed by state or state-enabled actors. Building emotional scepticism and informational resilience also means that society will be more prepared to deal with current and future threats alike. Given the latest attempts targeting Singapore and Singaporeans, this will be critical to the country’s continued peace and stability in the years to come. Nicholas Fang is founder and managing director of market research consultancy Black Dot Research, which operates an independent fact-checking platform. He chairs an expert panel on strategic communications for the Ministry of Defence. He writes a monthly column for CNA.