As US and China compete over AI, middle powers can craft a third path

As US and China compete over AI, middle powers can craft a third path Between American-secured diffusion and Chinese developmental multilateralism, middle powers have space to make their presence felt The global AI race is becoming a contest over the international order. In June, the US convened the second summit under the 24-economy Pax Silica around secure supply chains, AI infrastructure and trusted technology partnerships. In July, all 193 UN member states met in Geneva for the inaugural Global Dialogue on AI Governance. The American pathway is built around control of the technological frontier. US companies dominate advanced chip design, cloud platforms, proprietary models and much of the software used to train and deploy AI. Washington is organising these assets through Pax Silica, full-stack export packages, public finance, semiconductor partnerships and cybersecurity networks. Access is widened among trusted partners while the most consequential capabilities remain subject to restrictions. This system offers partners high-performance technology, mature firms and deep capital markets. It also creates dependence on American licences, cloud services, model updates and policy continuity. American influence therefore rests as much on the conditions of access as on the technologies themselves. China’s offer appeals to governments seeking affordable models, local deployment and fewer alliance-based entry conditions. Yet maintenance, equipment compatibility, data practices, technical standards and supplier relationships may leave partner states dependent on Chinese systems even when models are locally operated. WAICO’s influence will depend on whether it develops a stable budget, functioning secretariat and credible projects beyond diplomatic declarations. [Image text:] let the AI AI Global Dialogue on Al Governance