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Distrust in the media and courts can cause democratic backsliding, study suggests

Distrust in the media and courts can cause democratic backsliding, study suggests
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Distrust in the media and courts can cause democratic backsliding, study suggests Gaby Clark Scientific Editor Andrew Zinin Chief Editor Democratic backsliding can be tricky to spot. That's why most citizens rely on researchers, reporters and other third-party oversight bodies to detect and raise awareness of actions that subvert democracy. While these groups shine a crucial spotlight on government actions, what happens when those directing the light are distrusted?

Distrust in the media and courts can cause democratic backsliding, study suggests Gaby Clark Scientific Editor Andrew Zinin Chief Editor Democratic backsliding can be tricky to spot. That's why most citizens rely on researchers, reporters and other third-party oversight bodies to detect and raise awareness of actions that subvert democracy. While these groups shine a crucial spotlight on government actions, what happens when those directing the light are distrusted? A new study published in Political Science Research & Methods finds that when an oversight body is contested, individuals may doubt the intent behind the criticisms, thus potentially allowing for democratic backsliding. Political scientists Robert Gulotty, an associate professor, and Zhaotian Luo, an assistant professor, at the University of Chicago wanted to explore why it appeared that warnings from oversight bodies did not always spur corrective actions. To explore the issue, the researchers created a game theory model with three players: citizens, incumbents and oversight bodies. In this model of electoral accountability, a citizen may remove the backsliding incumbent, thus deterring actions that subvert democracy. Then, the team introduced the element of uncertainty. What counts as backsliding? When citizens hear of a controversy, they must still decide whether there are sufficient grounds to act. The choice becomes more difficult when controversial policy choices or rhetoric are ambiguous—are they subversive and worthy of removal, or nonsubversive and excusable? "A nonsubversive action is not actually harming the citizen, but at the same time, it is not as distinguishable as the clean action," Luo explained. "It's an action in the gray area." The model emphasizes two ways that backsliding may not be obvious. The first is backsliding by stealth: A power grab may go unnoticed and corruption can go undetected, until it is. One example is President Richard Nixon's Watergate scandal, which led to his resignation. The second form of nonobvious backsliding is under the cover of an excuse: Citizens must be alerted to suspicious behavior and also believe that accusations are accurate. The latter is a difficult task both because institutional degradation can be hard to evaluate and because individuals may distrust the oversight group issuing the criticism. In other words, politicians' claims of "fake news" may cause people not to act. When oversight is contested by the incumbent, voters use this criticism to decide whether the oversight body is malicious. This creates a strategic dilemma for groups that hold politicians accountable, like the media or courts, in deciding how or when to alert citizens of particular behaviors. According to Gulotty, more responsible oversight bodies tend to be more cautious when criticizing incumbent politicians to maintain credibility. This creates a problem. "If you're a citizen or a voter, and you're hearing criticism, who is likely to send that kind of signal? The kind of oversight that's out to get the president," Gulotty said. "So, you end up learning more about the fact that these guys are out to get [the incumbent] than you learn about the criticism itself. We call that the fake news effect." Cautious criticism In the paper, the researchers distinguish cases of effective and ineffective oversight by the effects it has on incumbent behavior, voter learning and the type of backsliding that occurs. When oversight is effective, criticism guarantees removal, thus deterring actions that can be mistaken for subversion. When oversight is ineffective, however, warnings to citizens are ignored, the incumbent is undisciplined, and the incumbent takes actions that can be mistaken for subversion. The breakdown is caused by the dual demands on oversight: Accountability groups must decide whether an action is a grab for power and also act in a way that ensures their criticisms are believed. From a citizen's perspective, criticism is proportionally more likely to come from a malicious oversight body. Therefore, a responsible, nonmalicious oversight body might act cautiously and require stronger evidence of subversion before issuing criticism. But caution also has a downside. Together, the caution and fake news effects turn the oversight body against itself. In an effort to adjust to avoid raising false alarms, any criticism can sound like a witch hunt. Ideally, citizens hold incumbents accountable for backsliding behaviors identified by oversight bodies. But when politicians engage in actions that, while not subversive, are possibly mistaken for subversion, research suggests that backsliding is difficult to deter or correct. According to Gulotty and Luo, the study underscores the limitations of formal or legal constraints on power, and the threat posed to democratic institutions when oversight bodies' ability to operate is threatened. More information Robert Gulotty et al., Backsliding under contested oversight, Political Science Research and Methods (2026). DOI: 10.1017/psrm.2026.10109 Provided by University of Chicago
Gaby Clark Scientific (PERSON) Andrew Zinin (PERSON) Democratic (ORG) Political Science Research & Methods (ORG) Robert Gulotty (PERSON) Zhaotian Luo (PERSON) the University of Chicago (ORG) Luo (PERSON) Richard Nixon (PERSON) Watergate (EVENT) Gulotty (PERSON)
Originally published by Phys.org Read original →