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America’s AI Chip War Is Heating Up in the Dumbest Possible Ways

America’s AI Chip War Is Heating Up in the Dumbest Possible Ways
Key Points

This week, the Trump administration made it significantly harder for Chinese companies to access some of the world’s most advanced AI chips. For years, tech firms like Alibaba and ByteDance could rent computing power from data centers overseas, allowing them to use powerful Nvidia chips they were generally prohibited from physically importing into China. This is known as remote access.

This week, the Trump administration made it significantly harder for Chinese companies to access some of the world’s most advanced AI chips. For years, tech firms like Alibaba and ByteDance could rent computing power from data centers overseas, allowing them to use powerful Nvidia chips they were generally prohibited from physically importing into China. This is known as remote access. But under new plans announced on Monday, overseas data centers that want to provide large amounts of computing power to China will have to get special licenses and deal with other annoying new kinds of red tape. The White House also imposed stricter rules on shipments of advanced chips to five countries, including Singapore and Malaysia, where US officials suspect significant levels of smuggling may have taken place. These are not new policy ideas, and similar proposals have been kicking around in Washington for a while. But the timing of Monday’s announcement is impossible to ignore. Yes, this is about Jensen Huang’s sex life. As you’ve probably heard by now, the Nvidia cofounder resigned as CEO last week after admitting he had an affair with Alice Huang, a Chinese businesswoman accused of having ties to Chinese intelligence services. Alice previously worked at the Singapore-based data center company Megaspeed, which offered remote access services and is suspected of engaging in chip smuggling. The scandal may have been so embarrassing for the White House that officials felt compelled to demonstrate they had the situation under control. Apparently, the cheating scandal of the century was the motivation they were missing. (A White House spokesperson previously told WIRED that the new rule would “crack down on the smuggling of advanced US SI chips” and “help ensure that America’s most advanced chips go first to US SI innovators, not Chinese shell companies.”) It started in the fall of 2022, when the Biden administration unveiled a set of rules that would radically alter the future of AI and who was allowed to build it. The goal was to choke off China's access to the advanced chips needed to train the world's most powerful AI models, as well as the equipment required to manufacture those chips. It's worth remembering just how radical this approach was at the time. For decades, the US had used export controls to keep sensitive American technology away from specific military programs, governments, and blacklisted companies accused of carrying out human rights abuses. But the Biden administration was attempting something far more ambitious: using Washington's influence over the global semiconductor industry to hold back the world's second-largest economy from competing at the cutting edge of one of the most important new technologies in generations. The strategy rested on a relatively simple idea. Training the most advanced AI models requires enormous amounts of computing power, and American companies like Nvidia dominate the market for the chips that provide it. By restricting China's access to those chips, Washington hoped to preserve America's technological lead. Four years later, the US certainly cannot claim total victory. But boy, have things gotten messy. Part of the problem is that Washington tasked the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), a relatively small, underfunded agency within the Commerce Department, with leading enforcement of the controls. The bureau had a budget of just $235 million in 2026—a paltry sum compared to what Nvidia rakes in in a single week. The bureau's job only got harder as the Biden administration introduced successive rounds of increasingly complex restrictions, scrambling to tighten the rules as chipmakers found increasingly elaborate ways to get around them. But one of the bureau's biggest challenges was fighting what became a booming industry for smuggling AI chips into China. At BIS, Megaspeed has become a poster child for the problem, although it's far from the only company suspected of involvement, or even the largest, according to a person familiar with the matter. According to Bloomberg, roughly 50,000 of the estimated 136,000 AI chips Megaspeed imported into Malaysia and Indonesia in 2024 and 2025 weren't accounted for in Nvidia's initial inventory checks. It's not clear where they may have ended up. (Nvidia later said it had found at least some of them.) Even if all of the unaccounted-for chips ended up in China, they would represent only a fraction of the advanced semiconductors believed to have been smuggled into the country over the past few years. Researchers at the Institute for Progress estimate that, by the end of 2026, China could have accumulated smuggled computing power equivalent to roughly 1 million of Nvidia's high-end H100 chips. But all along, Chinese companies didn't necessarily need to smuggle chips into the country to use them. They could just rent computing power from data centers in other countries, and best of all, the practice didn’t violate US export controls. This wasn’t some hidden loophole—every policymaker and researcher who worked on the chip restrictions was deeply aware of it. So why let the practice continue? For one, renting computing power can be more expensive and cumbersome than owning the chips outright, especially for companies that need to train large AI models over long periods. Some analysts argued that allowing Chinese firms to use American technology overseas could help keep them dependent on it instead of pushing them to develop domestic alternatives. Restricting access would also be difficult to enforce and could hurt US technology companies. Now, Washington is moving into this territory anyway. Monday's announcement represents another significant expansion of US efforts to control China's technological development. In 2022, Washington set out to prevent Chinese companies from acquiring certain American chips. Four years later, it’s trying to regulate how Chinese companies use those same chips, even when the hardware never enters China. Whether that's a good idea depends partly on how much the original restrictions have actually accomplished. There is evidence that export controls have made it considerably harder for Chinese AI companies to acquire the kind of computing power of their American competitors. But assessing the precise impact of the policies has proven to be extremely difficult. This strategy comes with a lot of risks, and like with everything else in life, there are real winners and losers. For example, forcing US chip companies to cut off Chinese customers has come at a cost to American companies. In a study of earlier US export restrictions, researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that affected American suppliers struggled to replace lost business in China with new customers elsewhere. They estimate that the restrictions wiped $130 billion from the companies’ combined market value, while also hurting their profitability and employment. The restrictions have also given China a very powerful incentive to find ways to compete in AI without relying on American technology. Huawei, for example, developed a way to link powerful chips together to create larger, more powerful megachip systems. The Chinese AI lab DeepSeek proved to the world that finding ways to make training more efficient could help developers build competitive models with fewer resources. I worry that the Trump administration will soon find that it has gotten out over its own skis. It’s now trying to control not only which chips Chinese companies can buy from American companies, but also how they can use American technology anywhere it may be in the world. I’m not sure that is the kind of responsibility I want to bestow on anyone in response to what happened in one person’s sex life. This is an edition of Will Knight’s AI Lab newsletter. Read previous newsletters here.
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Originally published by Wired Read original →