Analyzing the dynamics in defense/counter-defense games among hosts and pathogens

In the dynamic interplay between hosts and pathogens, hosts may produce a defense compound that acts as a toxin to deter pathogen attack. Conversely, pathogens may evolve to produce a counter-defense enzyme, neutralizing the host's toxin. This evolutionary arms race incurs costs for both parties, prompting adaptations and strategic shifts. We conceptualize this interaction as an asymmetric game, with hosts and pathogens as players, and their potential responses - defense, counter-defense, or inaction - as their strategic options. In this scenario, if the pathogen's counter-defense enzyme is entirely effective, then the host's toxin is rendered obsolete. However, should the host cease toxin production, the pathogen's enzyme becomes redundant, ironically reinstating the toxin's utility. This interaction leads to potential red-queen cycles in defense and counter-defense strategies under certain conditions, or a balanced, optimal production of toxin and enzymes by hosts and parasites, respectively. To explore this, we introduce a game-theoretical model incorporating replicator dynamics to examine temporal shifts in strategy from active (counter-)defense to non-(counter-)defense and back. In addition, we analyze compromise strategies and interpret them as bet-hedging-like. We provide a deterministic illustration of how partial defense and counter-defense generate a fitness-buffering structure in unpredictable environments and increase the geometric mean fitness of the population. In conclusion, our analysis supports the notion of continuous periodic adjustments in strategies, notably in the levels of defensive and counter-defensive measures.