\mathcal{O}(k^5/\epsilon^2)$

Revenue Guarantees of No-Swap-Regret Dynamics in First Price Auctions

arXiv:2606.06085v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study the revenue of approximate correlated equilibrium in discrete first price auctions - the set of allowable bids is $\mathcal{B} = \{0, 1/k, \dots, 1 - 1/k, 1\}$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$. We show that the revenue of any $\epsilon$-approximate correlated equilibrium is at least $v_2 - \Theta(1/k)- \Theta(\epsilon k^2)$, where $v_2 \geq 0$ is the second-highest valuation. Our results establish the first polynomial convergence rates on...