Llama Guard
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BraveGuard: From Open-World Threats to Safer Computer-Use Agents
Announce Type: replace Abstract: Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to sustained interaction with files, terminals, browsers, and external tools. This shift creates safety risks that are difficult to detect from isolated prompts or final responses, because harm often emerges only through multi-step execution traces whose individual actions appear locally benign. We introduce BraveGuard, a self-evolving defense framework for training guard models from open-world...
BraveGuard: From Open-World Threats to Safer Computer-Use Agents
arXiv:2606.01166v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to sustained interaction with files, terminals, browsers, and external tools. This shift creates safety risks that are difficult to detect from isolated prompts or final responses, because harm often emerges only through multi-step execution traces whose individual actions appear locally benign. We introduce BraveGuard, a self-evolving defense framework for training guard models...
AgentRedBench: Dynamic Redteaming and Integration-Aware Defense for LLM Agents over SaaS Integrations
arXiv:2606.02240v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls. Existing benchmarks under-measure the threat: most cover only a handful of integrations with the same attack payload replayed across runs, and open-source guards are trained on...
AgentRedBench: Dynamic Redteaming and Integration-Aware Defense for LLM Agents over SaaS Integrations
Announce Type: new Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls. Existing benchmarks under-measure the threat: most cover only a handful of integrations with the same attack payload replayed across runs, and open-source guards are trained on chat-style data rather than...
EvoDefense: Co-Evolving Black-Box Defense with Large Language Models
arXiv:2605.31140v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) remain highly vulnerable to diverse attacks, particularly in black-box settings where the internals of target models are inaccessible. Existing black-box defenses typically rely on pre-defined filtering heuristics, which often fail to generalize to unseen attack types and target model architectures. We introduce EvoDefense, an experience-guided co-evolving black-box defense paradigm.