Post-Quantum Future
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Related Articles from SNS
A Post-Quantum Future for Let's Encrypt
Let’s Encrypt is committed to a post-quantum-safe Web PKI. The path we’re planning to take is Merkle Tree Certificates (“MTCs”), a new approach that adds post-quantum authentication to the web without sacrificing the speed and reliability that have made TLS universal. This post is about these plans and why we believe MTCs are worth pursuing as a key to a post-quantum future.
Empirical Evaluation of Large Language Models for Migration of Code Fragments to Post-Quantum Cryptography
arXiv:2606.07341v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) requires not only replacing vulnerable cryptographic primitives, but also refactoring the surrounding software logic. While existing PQC migration frameworks provide organizational guidance, practical code-level remediation remains largely manual and error-prone. This paper evaluates whether large language models (LLMs) can be trained to assist in the migration of pre-quantum cryptographic code...
SoK: Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Implementation in Software Systems
arXiv:2606.04669v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is essential to protect software systems from emerging quantum-enabled threats. Although standardised PQC algorithms are now available, developers and organisations continue to face significant challenges in integrating them into real-world software systems. While existing studies primarily focus on cryptographic performance and algorithmic security, it provides limited understanding of the...
Fast TetraBFT: Optimizing Latency Where It Matters
Announce Type: new Abstract: Unauthenticated Byzantine consensus protocols achieve optimal failure resilience while relying only on authenticated point-to-point channels, not authenticated messages. They are an attractive building block for blockchains that do not mandate symmetric trust assumptions as well as for future post-quantum settings. We consider unauthenticated Byzantine consensus in partially synchronous networks and focus on optimizing its good-case latency - the worst-case time...
wolfSSL releases a new product; wolfCOSE a zero alloc C embbedded COSE stack
wolfCOSE is a lightweight C library implementing CBOR (RFC 8949) and COSE (RFC 9052/9053) using wolfSSL as the crypto backend. - Complete RFC 9052 message set: all six COSE message types, including multi-signer COSE_Sign and multi-recipientCOSE_Encrypt /COSE_Mac - Post-quantum signing: ML-DSA (Dilithium) at all three security levels - 40 algorithms across signing, encryption, MAC, and key distribution - Zero dynamic allocation: all operations use caller-provided buffers - Tiny footprint: 7.5...
Future-Proofing Authentication Against Insecure Bootstrapping for 5G Networks: Feasibility, Resiliency, and Accountability
arXiv:2510.23457v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The 5G protocol lacks a robust base station (BS) authentication mechanism during the initial bootstrapping phase, leaving it susceptible to fake BSs, spoofed broadcasts, and large-scale manipulation of System Information Blocks (SIBs). Existing solutions incur high communication overhead, rely on centralized trust, and lack accountability and long-term breach resiliency. Given the inevitability of BS compromise and the severe impact of...