Capability and Robustness Cannot Both Be Free: An Information-Theoretic Bound for Vision-Language-Action Models

arXiv:2605.25889v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models reach high success rates on clean inputs but collapse under small adversarial perturbations: a $16/255$ PGD attack drops OpenVLA-7B's LIBERO success from $95\%$ to under $5\%$. Whether this trade-off has a theoretical floor was open. We prove that it does. For any VLA policy, capability $I(\Astar;\Api)$ and robustness $I(\Api;\Atildepi)-I(\Api;\delta)$ sum to at most $H(\Astar)+I(X;\Xtilde)$, the task entropy plus adversarial channel capacity. The proof reduces to two applications of the Data Processing Inequality. The pixel-level bound is loose by $\sim 10^3$ nats and serves as a ceiling guarantee; an encoder-specific corollary tightens it by over an order of magnitude, into a regime where realized capability already consumes $5$--$9\%$ of the budget. We validate Theorem~\ref{thm:main} with zero violations across $308$ cells: $252$ closed-form Gaussian-VLA, $48$ OpenVLA-7B$+$LIBERO$+$PGD ($4$ suites $\times$ $4$ $\eps$ $\times$ $3$ seeds), $4$ Square-Attack, and $4$ multi-step ($T{=}10$). A complementary measurability inequality $\Rob_{\text{disc}} \le \Cap_{\text{disc}}$ further holds across $144$ cross-architecture cells spanning OpenVLA, OpenVLA-OFT (continuous-$L_1$), and SmolVLA (flow-matching). The same construction yields three label-free diagnostics: a pre-flight encoder ceiling, a defense-forensics probe that localizes input-side vs.\ language-model intervention, and a head-agnostic robustness ratio comparable across discrete-token, $L_1$-regression, and flow-matching policies. Together these provide the cross-setting axis defense and architecture comparisons currently lack.